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STUDENT ARTICLE
"BLESS ME FATHER, FOR
I AM ABOUT TO SIN.. .":
SHOULD CLERGY COUNSELORS HAVE A DUTY
TO PROTECT THIRD PARTIES?
Terry Wuester Milne*
I. INTRODUCTION
When a young mother confides in her minister that she abuses her
baby while her husband is away, must the minister notify the husband or
call a child abuse hotline? When a man who believes his wife is "cheat-
ing" calls his priest to tell him that he plans to kill his wife, must the
priest take any action? If a member of an unorthodox religion which
advocates "free love" among members tells his spiritual counselor that he
has contracted AIDS, must the counselor warn other adherents?
In the well known case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California I (Tarasoff), the Supreme Court of California held that in sim-
ilar situations a legally enforceable affirmative duty could be imposed
upon psychotherapists. The first Tarasoff decision2 (Tarasoff I) held
that the relationship between a psychotherapist and patient imposed a
duty upon the therapist to warn a potential victim of danger.3 Two years
later, however, the court issued a superseding opinion4 which modified
the initial holding and imposed a duty upon therapists to use reasonable
* B.A., 1981, University of Saskatchewan. Currently, the author is a law student at the Uni-
versity of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.
1. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (en banc).
2. 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974) (en banc), vacated, 17 Cal. 3d 425,
551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (en bane).
3. Id. at -, 529 P.2d at 561, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
4. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (en banc).
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care to protect third parties from danger posed by a patient.-
Tarasoff has already generated volumes of legal analysis.6 The deci-
sion has been distinguished,7 extended,' and explained.9 However, the
potential for imposing a similar duty upon members of the clergy, who
function as counselors, has not been thoroughly explored."0 No pub-
5. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
6. The nationwide attention which this case has received is remarkable considering the fact
that the majority of states have not yet had an opportunity to decide whether their therapists will be
subject to a Tarasoff duty. Various fact situations make it difficult to determine how many states
have addressed the Tarasoff issue, but between 1976 and 1986, approximately 10 states made such
determinations. See infra notes 7-9.
7. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980)
(no duty to warn where county released juvenile delinquent who killed child within 24 hours of
release because juvenile had made only nonspecific threats of harm toward nonspecific victims);
Bellah v. Greenson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 911, 141 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977) (psychiatrists not liable for failing
to warn parents that daughter who killed herself had threatened suicide), modified, 81 Cal. App. 3d
614, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1978); Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 415 A.2d 625 (1980) (psychia-
trists treating members of love triangle incurred no liability for failing to warn one member when no
threat was revealed to therapist and such a warning would have violated doctor-patient privilege).
See also Hawkins v. King County, Dep't of Rehabilitation Serv., 24 Wash. App. 338, 602 P.2d 361
(1979) (attorney, who was unaware of client's propensities, owed no duty to warn where client posed
no threat to specific identifiable person).
8. Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983) (psychiatric patient threatened
victim directly, but apparently never made specific threats directed at victim during counseling;
court nonetheless held that therapists failed to protect a potential victim); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980) ("foreseeable violence" is not limited to identified, specific
victims, but may involve a class of persons at risk); Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669
P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983) (liability extended to provide recovery for injuries to young child
of threatened victim on basis that when patient makes threat to victim, injury to victim's child is also
foreseeable); Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982) (person in voluntary
commitment program received unrestricted weekend pass, left hospital, and shot wife and her lover;
court recognized therapist's duty to control a voluntarily committed patient if therapist foresees
patient will harm others); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979) (Tarasoff
type duty discussed in context of practitioners and physicians); Peterson v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421,
-, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (1983) (psychiatrist who released in-patient held liable on basis that therapist
"incurred a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect anyone who might foreseeably be endan-
gered by [the patient's] drug-related mental problems"). See also Sands, The Attorney's Affirmative
Duty to Warn Foreseeable Victims of a Client's Intended Violent Assault, 21 ToRT & INS. L.J. 355
(1986); Steinbach, AIDS ON CAMPUS Emerging Issues for College and University Administrators,
16 N.A.C.U.A. 113, 119-20 (1986).
9. See Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 358 (1976); Givelber, Bowers, & Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of
Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 443. See also Comment, Psychotherapists' Duty to Warn:
Ten Years After Tarasoff, 15 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REv. 271 (1985) (proposing a model statu-
tory duty to protect); Schopp & Quattrocchi, Tarasoff, the Doctrine of Special Relationships and the
Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 13 (1984); Comment, From Tarasoff to
Bradley: Courts Struggle to Apply the Duty to Control Mental Patients, 14 Cum. L. REV. 165 (1984);
Comment, The Dangerous Patient Exception and the Duty to Warn: Creation of a Dangerous Prece-
dent?, 9 U.C.D. L. Rnv. 549 (1976).
10. The focus of this article is upon information learned while the clergyperson is engaged in
"counseling" as opposed to formal "confession." See infra note 13. It has been suggested that "[a]
clergyman should, like the psychiatrist in Tarasoff, be required to disclose confidential communica-
tions when harm to innocent parties is threatened and imminent." Yellin, The History and Current
Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 95, 144 (1983).
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lished opinions have yet examined this issue.'1 One may predict, how-
ever, that courts will be confronted with the issue of such an extension
given the combination of an increasingly litigious society and the fact
that many persons no longer have qualms about suing members of the
clergy.
12
If courts were confronted with the issue of whether to extend a duty
to protect third parties to clergy counselors, the court's analysis would
most likely focus on the common law background of affirmative duties,
the facts of the Tarasoff case, and the rationale followed by the Tarasoff
court in its construction of the therapist's duty to protect potential vic-
tims. In light of these factors and because of the significant difficulties
which arise out of Tarasoff as they might apply to clergy counselors, 13 an
affirmative duty to protect or warn third parties should not be extended
to clergy counselors.
11. But see Sands, supra note 8, at 368-69 & nn.75-77 (citing Neufang v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety, No. 81-08118-CS, Fla. Cir. Ct., Broward County (filed Apr. 29, 1981)) where a Baptist
minister was sued for failing to take action to warn, protect, or otherwise prevent a counselee from
causing injury to the plaintiff counselee's wife. The court granted the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the basis that the counselee's violent nature was open, obvious, and known to the
counselee's wife.
12. See McMenamin, Clergy Malpractice, 90 CASE & COM., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 3; L. GUMPER,
LEGAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF MINISTRY 14 (1981).
13. Clergy counseling occurs when a person voluntarily discusses personal life concerns with
his or her recognized spiritual advisor. Participation in such counseling is generally neither a re-
quirement of one's faith nor an aspect of worship itself. Thus, counseling should be distinguished
from such practices as formal "confessions" and other sacramental practices or rituals on the basis
that the latter, while voluntary, are considered to be aspects of the practice of one's faith.
The term "clergy counselor" refers primarily to those who engage in a recognized spiritual
leadership capacity on a full-time, professional basis. Therefore, this discussion does not necessarily
encompass persons who may informally represent their faith in part-time and volunteer leadership
positions as Sunday school teachers, deacons, or elders.
Throughout this article, it must be remembered that individual members of the clergy differ in
vast respects, partly because fundamental tenets differ from faith to faith. In addition, various per-
sonal factors such as socio-economic background, educational attainment, and approaches to coun-
seling vary widely, both from one faith to another, and frequently even within one well-recognized
denomination.
The content of counseling given by clergy varies widely according to the beliefs of the parties
engaged in the process. While most clergy counselors emphasize spiritual needs of their counselee,
in practice, clergy counseling also encompasses discussion of a wide variety of physical and emo-
tional problems. Issues relating to the content of counsel given by the clergyperson are not addressed
in this article, but were raised in Nally v. Grace Community Church, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912, with-
drawn, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984). In that case, the parents of a young man, who committed suicide
after extensive counseling by the staff of Grace Church, sued the minister and the church on the
basis of clergy negligence and outrageous conduct. A motion for summary judgment was granted in
favor of the defendants, but the case eventually went to the California Supreme Court, which refused
to issue a written opinion. See McMenamin, Clergy Malpractice, 90 CASE & COM., Sept.-Oct. 1985,
at 3, 6.
3
Milne: Bless Me Father, for I Am about to Sin...: Should Clergy Counselo
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1986
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
II. THE DUTY ESTABLISHED IN TARASOFF
A. Common Law Background
At early common law, imposition of liability for failure to warn a
third party was virtually unknown14 because legal duty was based upon a
distinction between "action" and "inaction.""5 Action or "misfeasance"
by a party constituted active misconduct which created positive injury to
another for which the law recognized liability. In contrast, inaction or
"nonfeasance" was passive, and a mere failure to take affirmative steps to
protect another from harm supported no liability. 6 The rationale sup-
porting this distinction lay "in the fact that by 'misfeasance' the defend-
ant.., created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by 'nonfeasance'
[the defendant] ... at least made [the plaintiff's] situation no worse, [the
defendant].., merely failed to benefit him by interfering in his affairs."' 7
The misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction continues to provide much
of the basis of tort law today, as evidenced in the Restatement of Torts.
Specifically, the general rule of nonliability for nonfeasance is stated in
section 314: "The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that ac-
tion on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."'18
However, exceptions to this doctrine have been recognized. In a
limited number of situations, courts have recognized certain special rela-
tionships between individuals when custom, public sentiment, or views of
social policy' 9 have dictated recognition of an affirmative duty to act.
Special relationships have been recognized when either potential or ac-
tual economic advantage to one party exists which justifies the imposi-
tion of an affirmative obligation.20 The Restatement lists certain "special
relationships" which support various affirmative duties such as the rela-
tionship between (1) a carrier and passenger,2 ' (2) an innkeeper and
guest,12 (3) a possessor of property and invitee,23 and (4) one who takes
14. "[C]ourts were far too much occupied with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior to be
greatly concerned with one who merely did nothing even though another might suffer harm because
of his omission to act." W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 373 (5th ed. 1984) [herein-
after PROSSER & KEETON].
15. Id.; see also Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436 n.5, 551 P.2d at 343 n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23 n.5.
16. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at 338-39.
17. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at 373.
18. RESTAT MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
19. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at 374.
20. Id. (citing McNiece & Thornton, Affinnative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272 (1949)).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 314A(1) (1965).
22. Id. at § 314A(2).
23. Id. at § 314A(3).
[Vol. 22:139
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control of another and one who is controlled.24 The Restatement com-
ment to this section indicates that the list is not intended to be exclusive,
but to provide examples only. The comment further acknowledges that
tort law is in a state of flux and may in fact be progressing toward a
"recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence
or of mutual dependence."
'z5
Despite the Restatement's prediction of an increasing recognition of
duty, many courts have been reluctant to impose affirmative duties be-
cause of the myriad social policy implications of such changes.26 For a
variety of such reasons, liability for failure to act has been infrequently
imposed outside these recognized relationships. Therefore, the enumer-
ated list above has formed the standard in this area of American law for
decades. Accordingly, it is little wonder that the novel duty first recog-
nized in Tarasoff came as a shock to the legal community.
B. The Tarasoff Decision
In 1969, Mr. Prosenjit Poddar, an international student, received
counseling from a staff psychologist employed at the University of Cali-
fornia Berkeley Hospital.27 During the course of therapy, Poddar dis-
cussed his unrequited love and expressed fantasies of harming, or
perhaps even killing, a woman who had rejected his advances. Although
he never mentioned Ms. Tarasoff by name, it was clear that she was his
intended victim based on identifying references made by Poddar.28
Immediately after this particular appointment, the psychologist re-
ported the statements to two of his superiors, who were psychiatrists. A
joint decision was made to notify the campus police of Poddar's propen-
sities and to enlist their help in effecting an emergency commitment
under a new state commitment statute.29 The police successfully located
Poddar, but after talking with him, concluded that he was "rational."
They released him upon his promise to stay away from Ms. Tarasoff.
24. Id. at § 314A(4).
25. Id. at § 314A comment b.
26. Three states, Vermont, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, have criminal statutes which impose
a general duty, under limited conditions, to rescue another in peril. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
14, at 375 n.21. For a historical and comparative discussion of criminal provisions for failure to
rescue, see Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans: A Comparative Survey of Criminal Law Provi-
sions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 630 (1967).
27. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
28. Id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
29. The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5550 (West 1984).
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When the psychiatric staff, which made the original decision to enlist the
help of police, learned that Poddar had been released, they conferred
with the director of psychiatry at the hospital. The director, also a psy-
chiatrist, specifically ordered that no further action be taken to pursue
Poddar.3 Poddar did not return for psychological treatment. Two
months later, after Ms. Tarasoff returned to California from an extended
vacation, Poddar murdered her.
Ms. Tarasoff's parents originally brought an action to recover for
their daughter's death against three parties: the campus police, the ther-
apists involved in Poddar's case, and the therapists' employer, the Re-
gents of the University of California. The complaint essentially
predicated liability on two grounds: the defendants' failure to warn Ms.
Tarasoff or others who likely would have apprised her of the danger, and
their failure to bring about Poddar's formal commitment.31 All defen-
dants responded by asserting absence of a special duty of care to Ms.
Tarasoff and asserting immunity from suit under the California Tort
Claims Act.32 The California Superior Court sustained the defendants'
demurrers which led to the appeal to the California Supreme Court.
The supreme court made two initial findings concerning the plain-
tiffs' pleaded cause of action. First, noting that the plaintiffs had not
pleaded any "relationship between Poddar and the police defendants
which would impose upon them any duty to Tatiana [Tarasoff], '33 the
court upheld the demurrer of the campus police. Second, the court held
that the therapists could claim immunity for their failure to have Poddar
committed. 34 However, the court also noted that no specific statutory
provision shielded the therapists, or the Regents as their employer, from
liability for failing to warn Ms. Tarasoff, or those likely to contact her, of
the imminent danger.35 Thus, the court laid the groundwork which
would allow it to find liability under a newly recognized duty.
The court did acknowledge the general common law rule that a per-
son has neither a duty to control the conduct of another nor to warn
those endangered by another's act. 36 However, the decision then men-
tioned sections 315-320 of the Restatement of Torts, which address the
30. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 433, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
31. Id. at 433-34, 551 P.2d at 341-42, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
32. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
33. Id.
34. Id. The therapists' immunity was based on the fact that they were public employees. Their
failure to confine Poddar was a decision protected by statute. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 436, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
[Vol. 22:139
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duty to control actions of another, and noted that certain "special rela-
tionship[s]" invoke well-recognized exceptions to the general rule.37 Spe-
cifically, the court found that the patient-therapist relationship was
sufficient to support affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons.38
To support that holding, the court looked to cases which recognized that
a physician has a "duty to exercise reasonable care to protect others
against dangers emanating from [his] patient's illness."' As further sup-
port, the court quoted a law review article which stated that a psycho-
therapist, by entering into a doctor-patient relationship, becomes
sufficiently involved to assume responsibility for the safety of not only the
patient himself, but also of any third person whom the doctor knows to
be threatened by the patient.' °
The court then addressed two key arguments advanced by the thera-
pist defendants. The therapists' first contention, supported by an amicus
curiae brief from the American Psychiatric Association, claimed that im-
position of a duty to protect third persons was impracticable because
therapists generally lack the ability to accurately predict whether a pa-
tient will become violent.41 The court responded by analogizing a thera-
pist to a general physician who must regularly make predictions on the
basis of a diagnosis. However, the court did note that the applicable
standard of care would not require a therapist to make an accurate pre-
diction in every case because the standard requires only that a therapist
exercise the reasonable degree of care ordinarily possessed and exercised
by other therapists under similar circumstances.42 The court considered
the possibility of inaccurate or unnecessary warnings, but concluded that
the risk that "unnecessary warning may be given is a reasonable price to
37. Id.
38. Id. at n.6.
39. Id. at 437, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
40. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (quoting Fleming & Maximov, The Patient
or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1025, 1030 (1974)).
41. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24. Amici briefs, repre-
senting several professional societies, presented numerous articles which indicated that "therapists,
in the present state of the art, are unable reliably to predict violent acts; their forecasts ... tend
consistently to overpredict violence, and indeed are more often wrong than right." Id. Justice
Mosk, in a separate opinion, cited People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr.
488 (1975) in which the California Supreme Court itself had previously held that psychotherapists'
predictions of violence were unreliable in the context of commitment proceedings for sex offenders.
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 451, 551 P.2d at 353, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). Note, however, that in Tarasoff, the defendant therapists had accurately predicted the danger-
ousness of Mr. Poddar. Thus, the "inability to predict dangerousness" argument was irrelevant in
that case.
42. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
1986]
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pay for the lives of possible victims that may be saved."'43
Secondly, the defendants argued that requiring a therapist to warn
others would necessitate disclosure of confidential communications, 44
thus potentially chilling effective psychotherapy. Understandably, a pa-
tient may be reluctant to confide in or to trust a therapist if the patient
knows that the therapist is obligated to disclose to others certain aspects
of the conversation.45 In addition, one who is initially considering ther-
apy may be entirely dissuaded from seeking help because of similar
qualms over mandatory disclosure. If such persons go untreated, the end
result may be that truly dangerous persons would not obtain help. The
court responded to that line of argument by weighing those concerns
against the public interest in safety from violent assault. The court con-
cluded that the newly established duty must prevail.46
In support of the court's policy balancing, which heavily favored
public safety, it cited section 1024 of the California Evidence Code.47
The section, which is an exception to the general psychotherapist-patient
evidentiary privilege, provides that a therapist may testify concerning de-
tails of therapist-patient communications, notwithstanding the usual
privilege, when the therapist has reasonable cause to believe that the pa-
tient is dangerous. While the evidentiary provision does not mandate an
affirmative duty to disclose, the court felt that it provided a reliable indi-
cation of the legislative policy regarding the balance between confidenti-
ality and public safety. 48 Thus, the court concluded that "the public
policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psycho-
therapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is
essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where
the public peril begins."49
Tarasoff held that "once a therapist does in fact determine, or under
applicable professional standards reasonably should have determined,
that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that dan-
43. Id. at 440-41, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
44. Id. at 441-43, 551 P.2d at 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
45. Id. at 441, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26 (citing In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-
34, 467 P.2d 557, 567-69, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839-41 (1970)).
46. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 443, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
47. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27. See infra note 75 for the text of this
statute.
48. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 441-42, 551 P.2d at 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
49. Id. at 443, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
[Vol. 22:139
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ger."5° As previously indicated, discharge of this duty does not necessar-
ily require that the therapist warn the victim. The court, however,
provided little guidance as to what is required to fulfill this duty, and
stated merely that the "discharge of this duty of care will necessarily
vary with the facts of each case.""1
III. APPLYING TARASOFF TO A POTENTIAL CLERGY
"DuTY To PROTECT"
A. Difficulties Concerning the Lack of Clergy Control over a
Counselee
Although it is clear that Tarasoff recognizes a duty to protect based
upon the "special relationship" between a patient and a therapist, the
opinion does not provide a cogent explanation of why this particular rela-
tionship is "special." The court based its opinion on the fact that psychi-
atrists and psychologists exercise "control" over their patients. 2
However, close analysis of Tarasoff reveals that the "control" rationale
articulated was inappropriately applied to the facts of that case because
the psychotherapists had virtually no control over their patient. Thus,
although the court was able to articulate a rationale in support of its
determination that a patient-therapist relationship is special, this ration-
ale was inapplicable to the very facts of Tarasoff. A "control" rationale
is even less applicable to clergy counseling.
The court in Tarasoff stated that it followed a line of cases that if
"the defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person
whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the foresee-
able victim of that conduct,"53 then a duty is created, citing Restatement
section 315.14 The opinion then noted four sections of the Restatement
which illustrate other generally recognized "special relationships."55 In
these relationships, the very fact that one person is in a position to exer-
cise control over the actions of another is the basis of the imposition of
the duty. Parents, for example, are under a duty to control their child
and to prevent the child from intentionally harming another. 6 An em-
50. Id. at 440, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
53. Id.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). This section does describe a recognized
duty to control conduct of a third person, but neither the text nor the accompanying comments
provide assistance in recognizing the existence of a special relationship in a given factual situation.
55. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
19861
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ployer, in many circumstances, must prevent an employee from harming
others, even while the employee is acting outside the scope of employ-
ment.57 One who is in possession of land has a similar duty to protect
licensees upon his land from danger imposed by third parties if the pos-
sessor has the ability to control the third person." Additionally, "[o]ne
who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be
likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from
doing such harm."59
Although Tarasoff does not expressly draw parallels between these
sections and the therapist-patient relationship, the decision makes an im-
plicit assumption that a psychotherapist has at least some measure of
control over a patient. This "control" was the basis articulated by the
court for a duty to a third person who may be harmed by the patient.
The opinion made no attempt to define the nature or degree of con-
trol which it assumed the therapists possessed, nor did it delineate the
amount of control which might be necessary in other cases to support
such a duty. This omission has been criticized by commentators as a
serious oversight.' Specifically, Tarasoff does not distinguish between
in-patient and out-patient psychotherapy. In in-patient therapy (com-
mitment), impositon of a duty based upon control is logical because ther-
apists and other mental health workers routinely exercise actual control
over such patients.61 In fact, the majority of cases cited in Tarasoff as
supporting the duty to control involved such situations.62
Tarasoff itself, however, involved a voluntary out-patient who was
not subject to his therapist's control. A major problem with the holding
in this situation is that a therapist who is confronted with a potentially
dangerous out-patient has few options to exert "control" over the pa-
tient. If the patient is not receptive to the suggestion of voluntary com-
mitment, the only alternative which allows direct control is initiation of
involuntary commitment proceedings.6"
57. Id. at § 317.
58. Id. at § 318.
59. Id. at § 319.
60. See, eg., Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90
HARv. L. REV. 358, 365-66 (1976).
61. See, eg., Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982).
62. See, eg., Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827
(1976); Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Vistiea v. Presbyterian Hosp. & Medical
Center, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 469, 432 P.2d 193, 196, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580 (1967). See also Stone, supra
note 60, at 365.
63. Statutes governing this procedure vary widely. Many states make provisions for short-term
[V/ol. 22:139
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Involuntary commitment is a difficult, time-consuming process
which few mental health professionals, except licensed psychiatrists, can
instigate. Even if commitment is achieved, a significant time gap may
exist between the time the therapist decides that an individual is danger-
ous and the patient's actual commitment. If a therapist has little or no
ability to control a patient, it is fundamentally unjust to impute control
for the purpose of imposing liability.
It is even more difficult to support a special relationship based upon
a "duty to control" in the typical clergy counselor-counselee situation.
For example, if the counselee has never before met the clergyperson,
clearly there is no pre-existing relationship to support a duty to control.
However, even if the counselee and counselor have had some prior rela-
tionship, for example, where the counselee is a parishioner of the
clergyperson, such a relationship hardly establishes a basis of control."
During a counseling session, a clergyperson functions in many re-
spects like a therapist dealing with an out-patient. Like the therapist, the
clergy counselor exercises no direct control over the counselee.
Although many clergy openly invoke divine assistance which may bring
into play forces beyond both the counselor and counselee, it is difficult to
argue that the counselor personally exerts direct control over the coun-
selee. If a counselee manifests genuine signs of dangerous behavior, the
clergyperson, like the therapist, may suggest voluntary commitment. If
the counselee agrees, the counselor may exercise limited control based
only upon the counselee's consent to be transported to a commitment
facility. If, on the other hand, the counselee refuses a suggestion of vol-
untary commitment, the clergyperson has little more than psychological
power of suggestion over a counselee.
Thus, a court that proceeded to extend a Tarasoff-type duty to
clergy counselors would face a difficult task. The common law estab-
lishes, in effect, a presumption of no liability in the absence of a special
relationship. If a court attempted to establish a special relationship
based on the "control" rationale established in Tarasoff, it would be re-
quired to address the incongruities of Tarasoff.65 Even assuming that a
immediate commitment upon a limited showing of the patient's dangerous behavior. See, eg., Lant-
erman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WaLF. & INsT. CODE §§ 5000-5550 (West 1984). However, the
Supreme Court held in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) that the standard of proof required
in long-term civil commitment proceedings is proof by clear and convincing evidence. See also An-
not., 97 A.L.R.3d 780 (1980).
64. If, however, a counselee is also an employee of the religious institution and functions under
the supervision of the clergyperson, a duty to control is more logically imposed.
65. However, one cannot overlook the fact that Tarasoff was a policy-based decision. Given
1986]
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court could somehow reconcile the facts of Tarasoff with the rationale
followed therein, the control rationale would be inapplicable to the
clergy-counselor relationship absent true power to control a counselee.
B. Difficulties Concerning Confidentiality and Privileged
Communications
In Tarasoff, the defendants argued that imposing an affirmative duty
upon the therapist to warn or protect the intended victim required the
therapist to reveal at least a portion of the patient's communication to
some third person. This required revelation is diametrically opposed to
the common belief that a psychotherapist is ethically and legally bound
to keep all professional counseling matters confidential. Nonetheless, the
court in Tarasoff found that this interest in confidentiality was out-
weighed by concerns for "public safety."66
The defendants in Tarasoff presented extensive supporting briefs
from the American Psychiatric Association and other professional socie-
ties.67 The fundamental thrust of their argument was that confidentiality
forms the very essence of effective therapy. 8 Moreover, confidentiality is
essential for the benefit of the individual patient. When a patient believes
that comments to the therapist will be held in confidence, "[ilt sets the
stage for an exchange of thought, word and action at the emotional
level."' 69 When a patient trusts the therapist, a foundation for "transfer-
ence" is created. "[T]he essence of much of psychotherapy is the learn-
ing of trust in the external world by the formation of a trusting
relationship with the therapist."70 This relationship between the patient
and therapist becomes "the model for trust in the external world and
ultimately in the self. '7 1
When confidentiality fosters healing and transformation in individ-
ual patients, society as a whole benefits in several ways. Most obvious, of
course, is that for every potentially dangerous person helped, the threat
of harm to others is reduced. In addition, successful therapy also benefits
the Tarasoff court's extreme concern with public safety, it is conceivable that a court might con-
struct or extend an affirmative duty to clergy on a similar "public policy" basis by simply omitting
discussion of the foundation of the duty.
66. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442-43, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
67. Id. at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 344-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25.
68. Id. at 440-41, 551 P.2d at 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
69. Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L.
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society as a whole by providing examples which may serve to encourage
others to confront their own problems.
The societal expectation of confidentiality in the therapist-patient re-
lationship has led to statutory recognition of a testimonial privilege in
this area. Legislatures in many states have enacted a "therapist-patient
privilege" which serves to prevent a court from compelling a therapist to
testify in judicial proceedings concerning communications which the pa-
tient has made to the therapist.7" The policy behind this privilege was
clearly stated in Taylor v. United States:73
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the
world. He exposes to the therapist not only what his words directly
express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins,
and his shame. Most patients who undergo psychotherapy know that
this is what will be expected of them, and that they cannot get help
except on that condition .... It would be too much to expect them to
do so if they knew that all they say-and all that the psychiatrist learns
from what they say-may be revealed to the whole world from a wit-
ness stand.74
Nonetheless, this privilege has not been deemed absolute in all
states. At the time of Tarasoff, the California Legislature had adopted a
"dangerous patient exception" to the privilege.75  The exception defeats
the privilege if a therapist determines that a patient is dangerous to him-
self or to others.76
The Tarasoff opinion looked to this exception as indicative of gen-
eral "public policy" when a dangerous person is involved. Thus,
72. See, eg., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1986).
Subject to Section 912 and except as otherwise provided in this article, the patient, whether
or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing,
a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist if the privilege is
claimed by:
(a) The holder of the privilege
(b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of the privilege; or
(c) The person who was the psychotherapist at the time of the confidential communica-
tion, but such person may not claim the privilege if there is no holder of the privilege in
existence or if he is otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit disclosure.
Id.
73. 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
74. Id. at 401 (quoting M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272
(1952)).
75. The statute has not been amended:
There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself
or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of the communication is neces-
sary to prevent the threatened danger.
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although recognizing the benefits of confidentiality, the court held that
when a threat of danger to the public exists, confidentiality is expenda-
ble.77 Although the court indicated in a footnote78 that it was not actu-
ally equating the exception with the duty, the court did in fact use a
limited testimonial exception to create a pervasive affirmative duty. This
result, however, is squarely at odds with the claim that psychotherapy is
based upon confidentiality and contradicts other general policies support-
ing confidentiality.
Various studies have debated the effect which Tarasoff has had and
will continue to have upon both the practice of therapy and the public
perception of therapy.79 Study results have been used to argue, on the
one hand, that although therapists laud the benefits of absolute confiden-
tiality, many therapists in practice have no difficulty revealing patient
communications when genuine danger is detected.80 On the other hand,
it has been contended that some "conscientious" therapists are refusing,
out of self-interest, to treat patients who could present liability
problems.81 The truth is, of course, that imposition of a duty affects dif-
ferent counselors in different ways. The net societal gain or loss resulting
from a duty to protect will be a continuing source of debate as courts and
legislatures examine the possibility of accepting Tarasoff and its
rationale.
Any requirement which infringes upon a clergyperson's ability to
guarantee unfettered confidentiality requires compelling justification.
Many of the concerns which clergy could be expected to raise are similar
to those raised by therapists.82 However, the clergy counseling situation
77. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27. See also Sands, The
Attorney's Affirmative Duty to Warn Foreseeable Victims of a Client's Intended Violent Assault, 21
TORT & INS. L.J. 355 (1986).
Although there are important differences between the professions, an attorney's duty of
confidentiality to a client is similar to that of the psychotherapist's duty to a patient. Thus,
the failure of the defendant-psychotherapists in Tarasoff to convince the court of the neces-
sity of absolute confidentiality to insure proper treatment would likely fail should a defend-
ant-attorney make a similar argument.
Id. at 357.
The statement is especially true in light of the future-crime exception to the attorney-client
privilege and the intent to commit a crime exception to the general mandate of attorney confidential-
ity. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
78. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 441 n.13, 551 P.2d at 347 n.13, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27 n.13.
79. See, eg., Givelber, Bowers, & Bitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of
Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443; infra notes 80-81.
80. See Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the
Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. RaV. 165, 179-84 (1978).
81. See Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 358, 372 (1976).
82. See Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV.
[Vol. 22:139
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presents unique concerns due to the religious nature of the clergyperson's
work. In a discussion of confidentiality issues, a court would have to
consider these unique concerns in addition to the policies and principles
raised in Tarasoff.
For example, no widely recognized Canons of Ethics exist to which
members of the clergy subscribe. No licensing board sets minimum stan-
dards or attempts to assure competency in the profession. Thus, no read-
ily recognized statements are available on which to base general
standards applicable to all members of the clergy. Despite these vast
differences, American clergy are often considered as a homogeneous seg-
ment of society. Moreover, perhaps the most universal trait attributed to
the members of this fungible office is an ability and "duty" not to share
confidential communications revealed to them while they are engaged in
their professional capacity.
Most clergy who perform counseling would probably agree with the
American Psychiatric Association's amicus brief concerning the vital
role of confidentiality in the counseling relationship. 3 Much of the in-
formation learned by the clergyperson in a counseling setting is similar to
information learned by a psychologist or psychiatrist in a therapy ses-
sion. Moreover, because religious leaders are typically held to a high and
idealistic sociological standard, special pressure may exist for the
clergyperson to fulfill expectations of confidentiality, even apart from the
clergyperson's own spiritual values. Thus, both society as a whole and
the majority of American clergy place significant importance upon the
clergyperson's duty to maintain confidentiality.
As in the case of therapists, this widely held belief that clergyper-
sons must keep professional matters confidential has contributed to the
creation of a specific testimonial privilege. The "priest-penitent" privi-
lege, statutorily enacted in some form in forty-nine states,84 operates to
prevent a party from summoning a clergyperson to testify concerning the
content of certain types of communications received in the clergyperson's
163, 174 (1981) (making the familiar argument that if a duty to disclose were imposed upon the
clergy, counselees would not be as candid and effective clergy counseling would be hindered).
83. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. See also Menendez, Clergy Confidential, 39
CHURCH & STATE 128, 131 (1986) (quoting the Rev. Dean Kelley, longtime religious liberty special-
ist for the National Council of Churches: "It's a long-settled principle that the cure of souls is more
important to society than the conviction of a few defendants, however serious the offense.").
84. A collection of these statutes can be found in both W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, THE RIGHT TO
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professional capacity.85
Initially, the privilege was understood to apply only to communica-
tions received in confession.A6 However, modem statutes have defined
the term confession in various ways.87 Thus, the issue of whether privi-
leged protection presently extends beyond purely confessional and peni-
tential communications is critical in determining the degree to which
clergy counseling communications, many of which are not penitential,
are statutorily protected."8 When deciding whether communications re-
ceived during counseling should be protected, a court may examine the
applicable clergy-penitent statutory provision. Whether it speaks in nar-
row terms of confessions only, or more broadly in terms of confidential
85. The Supreme Court has stated in dicta that 'The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the
human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to
be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return." Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). See also Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds of
Religion and Conscience, 62 Ky. L.J. 377, 408 (1974) ("The priest-penitent privilege may be justified
on the ground that compelling the disclosure of religious confidence affronts human dignity and
invades personal privacy.").
86. L. GUMPER, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF MINISTRY 34-35 (1981).
The forerunner of the modem day clergy-penitent privilege was the Seal of Confession in
the Roman Catholic church. The Seal was a firm tenet of canon law well before the Nor-
man Conquest of England, and penalties for the violating priest were severe. The Seal
understandably found enforcement in the King's Court because the Court was staffed by
leading churchmen. Canon and common law were intertwined. However, no such privi-
lege existed at common or parliamentary law at the time of the American Revolution, and
with a limited exception, there is today no clergy-penitent privilege apart from statute.
Id
87. See, eg., In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (viewed the application of the
attorney-client privilege to the attorney's nonprofessional staff as similar to the ordained minister
and the minister's counseling staff and held that "draft counseling services" rendered by ordained
minister/chaplain were performed within the course of his function as a clergyperson and thus infor-
mation received in sessions was privileged); Boyles v. Cora, 232 Iowa 822, 6 N.W.2d 401 (1942)
(construed statute covering counselors to include observations as well as communications); Com-
monwealth v. Zezima, 365 Mass. 238, 310 N.E.2d 590 (1974) (extended privilege beyond "communi-
cations" to include "other acts by which ideas may be transmitted"), rev'd on other grounds, 443
N.E.2d 1282 (1982); cf. Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal. App. 2d 90,43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1965) (in a divorce
modification proceeding, court refused to hold that the privilege protected conversations between
husband and wife and rabbi, who acted as marriage counselor; however, court held that the parties
were bound to an express agreement they had made that communications of the spouses to the rabbi
would be confidential and that neither party would call him as a witness); Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121
Ind. App. 262, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950) (prejudicial error to strike minister's testimony regarding his
observations of a counselee's emotional state where the counselee's soundness of mind was in issue).
Several states have adopted statutes dealing with the privilege. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 12-21-
166(b) (Supp. 1986) (extends privilege if the communication is sought to (1) make a confession,
(2) seek spiritual counsel or comfort, or (3) enlist help or advice in connection with a marital prob-
lem); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1981) (privilege extends to any information confidentially commu-
nicated for a religious counseling purpose; however, the clergyperson may testify by express consent
of the person making the communication, except when the disclosure of information is in violation of
the clergyperson's sacred trust).
88. L. GUMPER, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF MINISTRY 37 (1981). See also, Annot.,
71 A.L.R.3d 794 (1976) (discussing privileged communications to clergy in general).
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and counseling communications generally, will be germane to, but not
necessarily determinative of, the court's holding. 9
The development of the clergy-penitent privilege highlights some of
the unique concerns which would arise if a clergyperson were required to
disclose confidential matters. Before the enactment of priest-penitent
statutes, attorneys were hesitant to subpoena members of the clergy be-
cause clergy were traditionally reluctant to testify concerning matters
discussed in confession or counseling.90 If a member of the clergy was
subpoenaed and then refused to testify, the court was forced to order
sanctions. The prospect of having a clergyperson, a "pillar of the com-
munity," placed in jail for upholding cherished religious beliefs contrib-
uted to recognition of the privilege in many states.91
When enacting the clergy-penitent privilege, some legislatures con-
sidered that compelling a clergyperson to testify might infringe upon the
clergyperson's first amendment rights. In these states, the privilege has
been deemed to belong not only to the penitent, but also to the clergyper-
son.92 Unlike other privileges, which normally belong solely to the cli-
ent,93 in these states, even if the penitent waives the privilege, the
clergyperson may still refuse to testify. Where it has been held that the
privilege belongs to the penitent alone,94 and where the penitent waives
it, the clergyperson could be required to testify or face sanctions. None-
theless, in forty-nine states, the very fact of the existence of privilege stat-
utes reflects a general expectation of confidentiality in such matters. In
addition to this general expectation, in those states which hold that the
privilege belongs to both the clergyperson and the penitent, the privilege
appears to evidence a dual intent to protect not only the societal expecta-
89. See L. GUMPER, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF MINISTRY 37-38 (1981).
90. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 95, 110 (1983). See also Menendez, Clergy Confidential, 39 CHURCH & STATE 128, 129-31
(1986) (explaining clergy refusal to reveal confessional secrets in courts).
91. See Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 95, 110-12 (1983).
92. See, eg., supra note 87; ALA. CODE § 12-21-166(b) (Supp. 1986). But see Yellin, The His-
tory and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 112 (1983),
indicating that first amendment concerns may not always be accorded much weight.
93. Because privileges are generally designed to protect the client's interest, they are normally
viewed as belonging to the client. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2290-
91 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Compare this, however, to the work product privilege which is
designed to protect both the client's interests and the interests of the attorney, and which courts have
held belongs jointly to the attorney and the client and may be raised by either. See M. LARKIN,
FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 11.03-.05 (1986); S. STONE, R. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGES § 2.04 (1983).
94. See, eg., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:478 (West 1981). Most states do not specifically ad-
dress who owns the privilege.
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tions of confidentiality, but also constitutional rights of the
clergypersonY5
In Tarasoff, the court first examined the therapist-patient privilege
and determined that the policy of the privilege was inconsistent with a
duty to protect prospective victims. The court then proceeded to ex-
amine the statutory exception to the privilege. Based on the rationale of
this exception, the court determined that invoking an affirmative duty
was appropriate. Similarly, in the context of the clergy-penitent privi-
lege, the existence of a privilege is inconsistent with a duty to protect.
Inroads into these privileges, however, may be viewed by courts to sup-
port a duty to protect. For example, the failure to specifically exclude
clergy from general duties of disclosure might provide a source for the
counter policy a court might seek. 96 Alternatively, a narrow construc-
tion of the privilege could also provide the basis for refusal to find that a
policy of confidentiality outweighs other concerns.
First amendment rights of the clergyperson, however, mandate
greater recognition of confidentiality in clergy counseling relationships
than the court afforded in therapist relationships. As the Supreme Court
has noted, "fundamental principles of conscience and religious duty may
sometimes override the demands of the secular state." 97 The first amend-
ment religion clauses, which were enacted to protect religious freedom98
and to ensure the separation of church and state,9 9 contain two distinct
mandates. The establishment clause, which wll not be discussed here,
directs that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.... ."1o The free exercise clause mandates that "[Congress shall
make no law] prohibiting the free exercise [of religion.]" 10' The free ex-
95. Cf. Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN FERN.
V.L. REv. 47 (1981) (discussing the first amendment's failure to shield clergy from malpractice
suits).
96. One seeking to impose a duty upon clergy might rely upon statutory duties which many
states impose upon all persons to report suspected child abuse. While the clergy are specifically
exempt from this duty in some states, there are approximately 35 states in which it appears that
clergy, as well as all other persons, are subject to this duty to report. See Menendez, Clergy Confi-
dential, 39 CHURCH & STATE 128, 131 (1986).
97. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445 (1971) (exemption for those who oppose partici-
pation in war applies only to those who oppose all war and not those who oppose participation in a
particular war).
98. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 812-19 (1978); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1030, 1053 (2d ed. 1983).
99. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 812-19 (1978); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1030 (2d ed. 1983). See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963).
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ercise clause could be of significant assistance to the clergy counselor
who believes that a duty to protect, which requires revealing confidential
communications, contravenes his or her religious tenets.
An individual bringing a first amendment claim bears the initial bur-
den of satisfying the court that the government action in question inter-
feres with a sincerely held religious belief." 2 If the clergyperson adheres
to a tenet10 3 mandating confidentiality, this test will be relatively easy to
satisfy."°4 However, if the counselor has merely a personal or profes-
sional preference for confidentiality and can base this preference upon no
particular belief, it may be more difficult to meet this threshold
requirement.105
Once the clergyperson successfully meets the "sincerity" test, the
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate a "compelling necessity"
for the law in issue.106 In deference to religious liberty, if a less restric-
tive alternative to the offensive law exists, it must be adopted.1"7 Assum-
ing that the government makes a "compelling necessity" argument, the
court must then balance the respective interests.108 As a part of this bal-
ancing process, the court will consider the adverse effects that recogni-
tion of the free exercise claim might have upon the fulfillment of
102. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972) (state requirement that all children attend
public school until age 16 interfered with Amish beliefs where exposure of Amish teens to "secular
teaching" directly conflicted with sect's teachings); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963)
(unemployed Seventh-Day Adventist made showing that denial of unemployment benefits due to
refusal to work on Saturdays on religious grounds interfered with religious beliefs).
103. As long as a belief is sincerely held by the individual, the belief need not necessarily be a
recognized tenet or teaching of one's church or sect. Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 81 (3d Cir.
1980).
104. Parties often stipulate the sincerity of the religious proponent. See, eg., Varga v. United
States, 467 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd, 618 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1980); Johnson v.
Motor Vehicle Div., 593 P.2d 1363, 1364 (Colo.), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); see also Note,
Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE
L.J. 350, 355 (1980).
105. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (conscientious-objector must be
opposed to all wars, not just "unjust" wars; a belief based on the soldier's humanist approach to
religion). But see M. KoNvrIz, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 78-79 (1968) (the very
determination of whether an individual's belief is a "fundamental principle" of their faith involves
judicial inquiry into religious doctrine, a traditionally forbidden subject).
106. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-15, 221-29; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09.
107. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
108. Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds of Religion and Conscience, 62 Ky. L.J.
377, 398 (1974).
[Tihe degree of interference with the free exercise of religion is usually higher in cases of
direct conflict [choice between abandoning religious principles or facing criminal prosecu-
tion] than in cases of indirect conflict [choice between following religious principles and
suffering economic or other loss], and this should be considered as a factor in the process of
striking a balance between the state and individual interests.
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governmental objectives. 10 9
Because cases in this area have been fact intensive and not necessar-
ily consistent, an unsettled area of constitutional law has resulted, I° pro-
viding little substantive guidance for the parties or the courts."1
Generally, however, risks to public health and safety are weighed heav-
ily. 112 On the other hand, if a law requires an individual to take affirma-
tive action in contravention of his or her beliefs, 1 3 as opposed to a law
which merely proscribes desired action,11 4 courts have been reluctant to
outweigh free exercise claims.
When faced with the issue of extending Tarasoff to the clergy, a
court will have to confront and weigh difficult arguments surrounding
confidentiality and privilege issues. On one hand, it may be argued that
absolute confidentiality is impractical when viewed in light of public
safety concerns, and that a threat to the safety of an identified person
109. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) (refusal to exempt Amish employer from
social security tax and employer's contributions). The idea had been previously considered in
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
110. Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Author-
ities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 350-51 (1980).
111. Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327, 330 (1969); see also
Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds of Religion and Conscience, 62 KY. L.J 377, 398
(1974).
112. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (interest in public health required vacci-
nation notwithstanding contravention of religious belief); United States v. Spears, 443 F.2d 895 (5th
Cir. 1971) (public policy against use and trafficking of drugs outweighed defendant's claim that
possession and use of heroin, marihuana, and peyote were an essential aspect of Black Muslim rit-
ual), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1979); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp.
488 (W. D. Wash. 1967) (upheld judge's right to order blood transfusion for child despite fact that
the transfusions were in violation of parents' religious beliefs). But see People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d
716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (en banc) (California Supreme Court created an exemp-
tion from laws prohibiting the use of peyote in religious ceremony by American Indians).
113. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish children cannot be required to attend
school until reaching age 16 if contravenes teaching of their faith); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (individual cannot be required to salute flag in contravention of
beliefs); In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963) (court reversed its previous decision upon
remand from the Supreme Court, 375 U.S. 14 (1963) and held that an individual may not be re-
quired to serve on a jury where her religion required that she "not judge her fellow man"). See also
provisions for conscientious objectors at 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1981): "Nothing contained in this
title. . . shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in
the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Cf. Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise
Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1969): "[T]here are very few positive acts which the state compels
by the threat of criminal penalties without according individuals alternative options. These duties of
positive action consist of military service, jury duty, the payment of taxes, and a few others." Id. at
346. Although failure to follow a duty which required a clergyperson to reveal confidential commu-
nications would subject the clergyperson primarily to civil penalties, the principle at stake is similar.
114. See, eg., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (forbidding polygamy notwithstand-
ing Mormon belief); State ex rel Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975) (forbidding snake
handling by religious adherents on public nuisance theory), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
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should outweigh a general policy of confidentiality. 15  On the other
hand, it may be argued that clergy counseling functions best and pro-
vides the best societal protection and effectiveness when a clergyperson
can give to his counselee an absolute assurance of confidentiality. Addi-
tionally, the clergyperson's first amendment rights are not jeopardized
when the counselor can assure complete confidentiality.
C. Difficulties Concerning Destruction of Clergy Discretion in
Counseling
Legal recognition of a clergy "duty to protect" would result in a
number of negative consequences in the practice of counseling. There-
fore, a duty requiring that the clergyperson must reveal confidences in an
effort to ensure protection of a threatened person should not be imposed
without first weighing carefully the practical effect that such a duty
would have on a clergyperson's counseling discretion.
The desire to impose a legal "duty to protect" upon the clergy seems
to presuppose that in the absence of an imposition, clergypersons would
never take steps to protect threatened victims. This is a naive assump-
tion. Most clergy members routinely handle delicate and sensitive mat-
ters and frequently make decisions which require the ability to weigh the
consequences of their actions. If a clergy counselor determines that the
benefit of maintaining confidentiality is outweighed by a threat to an-
115. See Menendez, Clergy Confidential, 39 CHURCH & STATE 128 (1986):
[Mr. Leo] Pfeffer [Professor of Constitutional Law, Long Island University, and Spe-
cial Counsel, American Jewish Congress] suggested two exceptions he believes should ap-
ply to the confidentiality principle. If the clergy member receives information 'about an
evil that is not yet complete and can be stopped, the privilege should not apply.' This
would include, in his judgment, continuing child abuse.
Secondly, Pfeffer favors exposure if information revealed only in confession leads to
injustice or compounds injustice. If an innocent person is in prison or scheduled for state
execution and a priest discovers through the confessional that someone else committed the
crime, Pfeffer believes the privilege should be abrogated.
Id. at 131.
Although Mr. Pfeffer's comments were made in the narrow context of "confessional" state-
ments, his comments are relevant to discussion of the broader counseling context. Insofar as he is
advocating the removal of the privilege from confessional communications, enabling the clergyper-
son to testify or disclose information received in confession at the clergyperson's discretion, his points
are well taken. If, however, he is advocating removal of the privilege so that the clergyperson may
be required to testify against the penitent, he seems to ignore the clergyperson's first amendment
rights.
In addition, the extremely subjective nature of the determination of whether an "evil is com-
plete" or whether it "can be stopped" is a major problem which Mr. Pfeffer has not addressed. See
infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text discussing the subjective nature of both clergy counseling
and psychotherapy. See also infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text advocating allowing the
clergy to exercise discretion concerning counseling options, rather than being compelled by a court,
which will of necessity be unfamiliar with the counselee's situation, to reveal communications.
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other's safety, most clergy will take necessary steps to notify either the
victim or the appropriate authorities.1 1 6
Currently, when a clergy counselor determines that a particular in-
dividual has the intent and ability to harm another, the counselor has
several options. The counselor may be able to engage the individual in
discussion and "talk him out of it." He may remain with the individual
or direct a staff member to remain with the person hoping that the con-
stant presence of another person will dissuade the individual. Alterna-
tively, the counselor may attempt some combination of immediate action
and long-term counseling. Under these options, it is unlikely that the
counselee will feel betrayed or will desire to terminate the counseling.
At times, however, many clergypersons will feel the need to contact
an appropriate authority or to warn the victim directly, in spite of the
counselee's anticipated reaction. In these circumstances, it is likely that
the counselee will react with anger at the presumed "betrayal" which has
occurred, and termination of that particular counseling relationship may
result.
The point, however, is not whether these situations arise in clergy
counseling. Rather, the point is that the determination as to which cases
the clergyperson should reveal confidential matters should be made by
the clergyperson, and not by a court in an after the fact review. If the
clergyperson believes that the benefits of long-term counseling outweigh
the short-term crisis, he or she should not be forced to sacrifice the coun-
seling relationship, but should be allowed to determine which situations
are appropriate to take "protective action" and which are appropriate to
"monitor and counsel further."
It may seem, at first glance, that to allow the clergyperson such dis-
cretion runs counter to general concerns of public safety.' t 7 However,
allowing clergypersons to continue to make such determinations accord-
ing to their experience and their ability will actually serve to better en-
sure public safety in the majority of cases.
If a duty to "protect" was extended to the clergy, clergy counselors
would have to take actions which might contravene their personal deter-
116. See, eg., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (1958), where a Lutheran minister revealed
the confession of a mother who chained her children when she left them. Of course, a few clergyper-
sons will maintain that the threat to a victim will never outweigh the benefit of confidentiality. How-
ever, persons with such absolute standards are unlikely to be convinced of the necessity to reveal
confidential communications by the threat of legal liability for failure to protect.
117. This concern stems largely from the fact that the law is uncomfortable with expectations
which cannot be legally enforced.
[Vol. 22:139
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mination of what is in the best interests of all concerned.11 Specifically,
when a clergyperson determined that a counselee posed a threat to an
identified victim, that clergyperson would be required to take some action
to "protect" the potential victim.119 Although Tarasoff does not specifi-
cally dictate what actions are necessary to fulfill a duty to protect,120 a
clergyperson who either called the police or warned the victim in an ap-
propriate situation, would probably escape liability even if the counselee
later committed the threatened act. In this type of situation, although
the clergyperson escapes liability, the victim may still have been harmed
and the ex-counselee rarely will have been helped. In fact, if the coun-
selee reacts in anger and terminates the counseling relationship, the pos-
sibility of future help by the clergyperson is also eliminated.
Thus, although the goal of imposing a "duty to protect" upon clergy
is to protect third persons, the effect will frequently be detrimental to the
counselee. In addition, no assurance exists that a potential victim, once
warned, can do anything to protect himself from harm,"2' even if he does
receive some measure of police protection. It takes little imagination to
envision the consequences which may result when an already potentially
dangerous counselee becomes enraged by a clergyperson's perceived
betrayal.
D. Difficulties in Determining and Applying a Standard of Care
In Tarasoff, the court held that a therapist had a duty to protect
which could be imposed at the point where a "reasonable therapist"
would determine that a potential victim was endangered. 22 As noted
above, this holding has been criticized extensively.123 However, even if
one accepts that the "reasonable psychiatrist" standard enunciated in
Tarasoff is workable, a comparable standard in the clergy context would
118. This argument was raised in the context of therapists in Givelber, Bowers, & Blitch,
Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. Rav. 443,
470-72.
119. Presumably every clergyperson believes that he or she is a reasonable person. Therefore, if
a duty to protect existed, all clergy would have to take action when they individually and subjec-
tively believed that a counselee was dangerous.
120. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. "While the discharge of
this duty of care will necessarily vary with the facts of each case, in each instance the adequacy of the
therapist's conduct must be measured against the traditional negligence standard of the rendition of
reasonable care under the circumstances." Id. (footnote omitted).
121. Mills, Expanding the Duties to Protect Third Parties from Violent Acts, in LEGAL EN-
CROACHMENT ON PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 61, 64 (1985).
122. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 440, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
123. See, ag., supra note 60 and accompanying text.
1986]
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be unworkable because of difficulties in formulating a "reasonable
clergyperson standard."
In Tarasoff, the court articulated the "reasonable therapist" stan-
dard by analogy to the well-known "reasonable physician standard." '124
However, the court overlooked significant aspects of the practice of psy-
chiatry which make it difficult to determine a "reasonable psychiatrist"
standard. For example, diagnosis in psychiatry is not analogous to diag-
nosis in general medicine. Few simple tests, such as blood tests or x-rays
used in general medicine, are similarly determinative of the psychiatric
patient's condition.12 Instead, a psychiatrist's diagnosis in large part is
based upon the doctor's experience in talking with and observing a par-
ticular patient. Thus, psychiatry itself lacks much of the certainty, objec-
tivity, and scientific reliability of general medicine.12 6 Moreover, when
psychiatrists, who are trained to deal specifically with human behavior,
acknowledge their inability to predict dangerous behavior; it makes little
sense to expect clergy, who most likely have less behavioral training than
therapists, to accurately make such predictions.
Because of varying beliefs and counseling practices of American
clergy, no single standard exists which could be applicable to all
clergy.12 7 What is promulgated by one faith may be completely unrea-
sonable in another. No licensing requirements1 28 or recognized volun-
124. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25, Admittedly, the goal of
both medicine and psychiatry is to diagnose and to cure, but the methods of diagnosis and manner of
treatment differ significantly.
125. Schopp & Quattrocchi, Tarasoff, The Doctrine of Special Relationships and the Psychothera-
pist's Duty to Warn, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 13 (1984):
This situation stands in stark contrast to that of the physician who may be expected to
accurately predict the probability of infection because it is the disease, which his training
enables him to diagnose, which is the source of the danger. However, when dealing with
psychological dysfunction, it is the person, not the disorder, who is dangerous and violence
has not been associated with any particular diagnosis by scientific explanation, or even by
close statistical correlation.
Id. at 32 (footnote omitted).
126. In addition, the court in Tarasoff required that the "reasonable psychiatrist" not only diag-
nose present condition, but also predict future dangerous behavior. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551
P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. This determination can be made with even less certainty; hence,
the basis for liability becomes attenuated. The Tarasoff court, therefore, set the "reasonable thera.
pist" standard outside the clalmed abilities of the profession.
127. See W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 171 (1983).
128. Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN, FERN. V.L.
REV. 47, 51 (1981).
The difficulty of establishing the definable limits of church-state separation is reflected
in the statutory exemption of clergy from government regulation or licensing. Were the
state to require licensing of the clergy, it would, on one hand, have to establish criteria of
eligibility which would necessitate the state's involvement in doctrinal and theological mat-
ters clearly forbidden by the first amendment, one purpose of which was to free religious
institutions from domination or interference by the state. The United States Supreme
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tary associations exist which encompass even the majority of
clergypersons in the United States. Even if one could articulate stan-
dards which might be applicable to Judeo-Christian religious leaders, this
standard would likely be inapplicable to persons such as Christian Sci-
ence practitioners, self-proclaimed gurus, and other leaders who hold be-
liefs outside the mainstream of American religion.
One possible solution is to hold a clergyperson to the standard of a
"reasonable clergyperson of that faith." However, this suggestion is im-
practical. Such a determination presupposes that it is possible to charac-
terize a clergyperson as a member of a definite category. Although
characterization is possible in many cases, many non-orthodox religions
are unique and may have arisen out of the leader's desire to escape the
doctrines and practices of organized and recognized religions. It would
be impossible to hold this type of leader to the standards of the particular
faith if the leader practiced a unique religion and was the only leader in
the "denomination."
Furthermore, even leaders who are members of recognized faiths
should not necessarily be held by the courts to the doctrinal standards of
their faith. Admittedly, in some faiths and denominations, the beliefs of
the religion are published as dogma and it is relatively easy to determine
the essential beliefs of the leaders.129 However, in other religious groups,
the individual church or religious group may follow a variation of the
recognized dogma of their faith, so that even various local units may
differ in the exercise of the same faith.
Additional problems prevent use of a "reasonable clergyperson of
that faith" standard. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to
hear cases which center upon the content of religious doctrine. 130 Thus,
Court, in a number of decisions, has recognized the sacrosanct nature of theological doc-
trine and the exclusive right of the religious authorities to determine it. On the other hand,
licensing by the state, even without fixed eligibility criteria, would have the state place its
imprimatur on religion and put it in the business of legitimizing anyone who claimed to be
a qualified clergyman.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See also CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 4980 (West Supp. 1986) which provides for licensing of
marriage, family, child, and domestic counselors. However, these provisions "shall not apply to any
priest, rabbi, or minister of the gospel of any religious denomination when performing counseling
services as part of his or her pastoral or professional duties .... Id. at § 4980.01.
129. This tends to be the case in many "mainstream" religions, such as Catholicism and Juda-
ism. In such faiths, a standard of that faith could theoretically be articulated. However, a court
could be expected to decline consideration of whether a clergyperson met the appropriate standards
of his faith. See infra note 130.
130. See, eg., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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a court could be expected to decline consideration of an issue which re-
quired determination of whether the counselor met the promulgated
standard of his own faith.
Grave difficulties exist in defining any standard to measure whether
a clergyperson should be legally subject to a duty to protect. 131 In an-
other area of law, the very fact that a standard could not be defined con-
tributed significantly to the court's refusal to recognize a cause of action.
In Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District,132 a high school
"graduate" alleged that the negligence of the school district deprived him
of basic academic skills. The Superior Court of California noted that
educators themselves cannot agree on what constitutes good teaching. 133
Thus, the court declined to formulate any standard and refused to recog-
nize the plaintiff's claim because the profession at large was and is
plagued by contradictory norms.
Even assuming a court could ignore the significant practical difficul-
ties inherent in creating a standard applicable to clergy, the court would
face overwhelming problems in applying any sort of standard to impose
liability in clergy counseling situations. Any clergy liability suit could be
expected to raise the familiar problem of professionals refusing to testify
"against" each other in regard to the appropriate standard of care. As-
suming that a standard of care could somehow be established by testi-
mony of other clergy, it would be exceedingly difficult to obtain clergy
testimony when the potential clergy witness did not personally observe
the counselee. In addition, clergy exercise various approaches to coun-
seling. Thus, it is unlikely that a clergyperson witness, even if she herself
would have made an attempt to warn the potential victim, would testify
that a defendant clergyperson did not meet a standard of reasonableness.
Finally, many clergy are concerned with protecting their "neutral" repu-
tation in the community. In light of their occupation as spiritual leaders,
their concern deserves consideration.
Additionally, deciding when a clergyperson had enough information
131. "There can be no general principles upon which a court might judge the clergy's perform-
ance of his or her duty to predict possible actions." W. TIEMANN & J. BusH, THE RIGHT TO SI-
LENCE 171 (1983).
132. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
133. Id.
Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom methodology affords no
readily acceptable standards of care, or cause, or injury. The science of pedagogy itself is
fraught with different and conflicting theories of how or what a child should be taught....
We find in this situation no conceivable 'workability of a rule of care' against which de-
fendants' alleged conduct may be measured ....
Id. at 824, 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 22:139
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upon which to act to protect the victim must be established after the fact.
Obviously, one cannot assume that the counselee told the clergyperson of
his intentions merely because the counselee talked to a clergyperson. 134
Obtaining proof of what transpired between the clergyperson and the
counselee imposes difficulties because in practice, many clergypersons
have incomplete or non-existent records of the content of counseling ses-
sions. This lack of complete records may stem from a number of factors.
First, clergy counseling does not always take place in an office setting. It
may be inconvenient for a clergyperson to take notes while visiting a
person in a jail or hospital. Further, the vast majority of clergy do not
charge their counselees for services. Thus, the clergyperson has no need
to maintain records for billing purposes. In some situations, such as a
church office staffed by volunteers, it may actually be advantageous to
not maintain records in the interest of the counselee's privacy.
The extreme diversity of clergy counseling practices from one faith
to another makes it impossible to define a widely applicable standard of
care. In addition, problems of proof are complicated by the fact that
clergy are not ordinarily required to keep records of their counseling. In
light of the fact that courts have, in other contexts, refused to impose
liability if defining a standard proved too difficult, 135 a court examining
this issue should refuse to extend a Tarasoff duty to clergy counselors.
IV. CONCLUSION
No resolution to this issue will protect every party in every case.
However, the current system, by which clergy counselors are free to use
their discretion in making decisions if there is a potentially dangerous
counselee involved, is preferred. The clergy, not the judiciary, has the
first-hand experience to make the best decision in the majority of cases.
134. This presumption would increase the possibility of false suits and would be devastating to
the reputations of the clergy involved.
135. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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